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ABSTRACT
The rule of law is often touted as a panacea for the problems faced by
the developing world. As a result, billions of dollars in foreign aid have
been spent trying to promote the rule of law in developing countries.
However, in many cases, little observable progress has been made. This
Note explores some of the reasons rule of law reform efforts have stalled.
One reason is that reform has focused solely on formal rule of law
institutions, rather than on the informal political or cultural norms that
are needed to support such institutions. Little is known, however, about
how to foster such political and cultural norms where they are lacking.
This Note argues that, at a minimum, fostering such norms requires a
will to reform on the part of governments and political elites. Foreign
aid, in the form of monetary transfers, has negative unintended
consequences on the will to reform. By drawing on the economic
literature detailing how foreign aid can provide perverse incentives for
developing country governments, this Note argues that foreign aid
decreases the incentives of governments and political elites to adopt a
will to reform. In turn, this makes rule of law reform less likely to be
successful.
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INTRODUCTION
The rule of law is often touted as a panacea for problems facing the
developing world.' It is thought to obviate violent conflicts and allay
postconflict turmoil. 2 It also is attributed with the power to accelerate
economic development and protect human rights.3 With all of the
wonders the rule of law is credited with providing, it may be a surprise
to learn that despite decades of reform efforts, very few of these wonders
have been realized.4 Blame for the disappointing result of international
efforts to build the rule of law in developing countries may not lie with
the rule of law itself; it might just be the panacea everyone hopes. The
problem is that despite decades of experience, there is still no blueprint
for how to build the rule of law where it is lacking.5 Efforts to build the
rule of law without such a blueprint have often been disastrous for the
presumed beneficiaries.
This Note does not attempt the herculean task of drawing the
needed blueprint, supposing one could even be drawn. Instead, this Note
addresses a further potential roadblock to rule of law reform: foreign
aid. 6 While the target of monetary transfers of foreign aid is often
economic development or poverty reduction and only indirectly the
improvement or development of the rule of law,7 targeting economic
development through foreign aid often has deleterious consequences on
the rule of law. There is a growing economic literature that highlights
the negative consequences foreign aid can have on economic
1. E.g., Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 3 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) [collection hereinafter
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD].
2. See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram, Prevention and the Rule of Law: Rhetoric and
Reality, in CIVIL WAR AND THE RULE OF LAW: SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS 71
(Agnbs Hurwitz & Reyko Huang eds., 2008) [collection hereinafter CIVIL WAR AND THE
RULE OF LAW] (examining the rule of law as a tool for conflict prevention); see also William
G. O'Neill, UN Peacekeeping Operations and Rule of Law Programs, in supra, at 91
(arguing that "the rule of law is an essential prerequisite for building a modicum of trust
in war-torn societies").
3. For the relationship between the rule of law and economic development, see
generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAw-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND EcONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (2006).
4. See, e.g., Stephen Golub, A House Without a Foundation, in PROMOTING THE RULE
OF LAW ABROAD, supra note 1, at 105, 112-15.
5. See Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD, supra note 1, at 15.
6. Foreign aid can be used to describe various sorts of international assistance, from
technocratic expertise to monetary transfers. For the purpose of this Note, foreign aid is
used to describe monetary transfers. The main point is that such monetary transfers
undermine technocratic assistance and rule of law reform.
7. See Golub, supra note 4, at 107, 109.
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development. This Note draws on that literature to explore the ways in
which foreign aid may negatively impact rule of law reform efforts. It
concludes that not only can money not buy the rule of law, but it can
hinder rule of law reform as well.
Part I of this Note briefly explores the concept of the rule of law and
previous efforts to build it in developing countries. This part highlights
that previous reform efforts have often failed because reformers largely
ignore the cultural or political elements of the rule of law and the
difficulty inherent in fostering such elements. Part II surveys the
economic literature surrounding the effects of foreign aid on economic
development and finds that much of this literature applies equally to
rule of law reform. This part suggests that attempts to build the rule of
law may be frustrated by influxes of foreign aid, much in the same way
economic development has been frustrated. Lastly, part III highlights
the findings in part II by looking at the effects of foreign aid on the
countries of sub-Saharan Africa. While it is certainly not possible to
conclude that foreign aid is the only reason why the rule of law is weak
in much of sub-Saharan Africa, this Note sheds some light on the ways
in which foreign aid could be a roadblock to rule of law reform.
I. THE RULE OF LAW
The rule of law is seen as a fundamental element of developed
countries; an element that developing countries must foster in order to
escape the trenches of poverty. This part explores what the rule of law
means and why efforts to foster it in developing countries have been
unsuccessful.
A. Defining the Rule of Law
The rule of law is an expansive concept, subject to multiple
meanings.8 It can refer to a set of rules that binds governments and
individuals,9 the presence and quality of specific legal or political
institutions,1 0 or the adequate protection of equality or human rights."
8. See generally Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD, supra note 1, at 31. For a taxonomy of various rule
of law concepts, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997); William C. Whitford, The Rule of
Law, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 723.
9. See Kleinfeld, supra note 8, at 36-44.
10. See id. at 47-48.
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Formal theories define the concept as a system of rules that are
transparent, public, and enforced regularly, predictably, and equally
against all persons, both citizens and political elites. 12 In particular,
government accountability to the rule of law is held as the sine qua non
of the rule of law,13 and it comprises a core tenet of formal theories of
the rule of law. The institutional approach defines the rule of law as a
set of specific formal institutions, such as written legal codes,
independent judiciaries, effective law enforcement bodies,14 and
democratic government.'5 According to the substantive approach, the
rule of law requires the realization of certain normative values, such as
substantive equality or the protection of human rights.16 These concepts
are not mutually exclusive; in fact, substantive theories encompass
certain formal rule of law elements, 7 and both substantive and formal
theories include institutional elements.
In theory, it does not matter whether the rule of law has one
meaning or many. The trouble lies in evaluating the efficacy of rule of
law reform efforts without defining what would count as successful
reform,' 8 for the "know it when you see it" approach is untenable.19
Furthermore, promoting one conception of the rule of law may often
conflict with the promotion of another.20 It is, therefore, important to
postulate what meaning of the rule of law is being used here to evaluate
whether foreign aid undermines that concept.
11. See id. at 44-46. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAw: HISTORY,
POLITICS, THEORY 91-113 (2004) (providing an in-depth look at formal and substantive
theories of the rule of law, and the differences between the two).
12. Kleinfeld cites Friedrich Hayek as a principal proponent of predictability as a by-
product of the rule of law. Kleinfeld, supra note 8, at 42-44 (referring to Hayek's work in
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1994)). Fallon cites both Hayek and John Rawls as holding this
"formalist" view of the rule of law. Fallon, supra note 8, at 16.
13. Kleinfeld, supra note 8, at 37.
14. Id. at 47-48.
15. See TAMANAHA, supra note 11, at 91, 99-101. Tamanaha sees democracy as an
extension of the "formal" rule of law concept. Democratic accountability and rule making
may be part of a "thicker" formal rule of concept-that is, with more requirements, but
democracy itself is best understood as an institution.
16. See Kleinfeld, supra note 8, at 44-46.
17. JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? 70-71 (2006).
18. See Thom Ringer, Note, Development, Reform, and the Rule of Law: Some
Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the "Rule of Law" and Its Place in
Development Theory and Practice, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 178, 182 (2007)
(explaining that if rule of law reforms are to be effective, they "must establish clear
institutional benchmarks," yet "conceptual anarchy about the meaning of the rule of law is
likely to produce competing and conflicting benchmarks in different states and systems').
19. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 17, at 56-58.
20. E.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 8, at 59-61.
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This Note focuses on the formal rule of law theory,21 because, at a
minimum, the rule of law encompasses the idea of a well-ordered
society; one in which there is a "government of laws, and not of men."22
The formal rule of law is as much a political and cultural concept as it is
a legal one.23 In this sense, the rule of law is both a set of formal rules,
which are public and transparent, and to which both the government
and its citizens are held accountable, and a set of social norms, which
reflect a cultural commitment to submit to the formal law as a means of
dispute resolution or democratic decision-making process. 24 Indeed, it is
the failure to recognize this cultural and political content in the formal
rule of law that has undermined efforts to build the rule of law in
developing countries. 25
B. Building the Rule of Law in Developing Countries
The last century saw the emergence of new nations, as many
countries in Africa and Asia broke free of their colonial masters. 26 It also
saw the collapse of the Soviet Union, 27 after which countries comprising
the Eastern Bloc regained their independence. These transformations
provided a unique opportunity for countries to unshackle themselves
from historical traditions and build new economic and political
institutions.28 Inspired by this opportunity, a development industry has
emerged, drawing economists, political scientists, lawyers, and
technocrats into its fold. Development efforts have focused on economic,
legal, and political institutions, including democratic transition to
21. For a more detailed description of a formal rule of law concept, see Robert S.
Summers, A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law, 6 RATIO JURIS 127 (1993).
22. MASS. CONST. art. XXX (drafted by John Adams). The rule of law concept has a
long pedigree, tracing its roots to Plato and, more recently, Adams. See DAM, supra note 3,
at 13. By adopting this concept of the rule of law, it does not follow that expressio unius est
exclusio alteruis. That is to say, by adopting the formal rule of law concept, I am not
making an evaluative judgment about the superiority of formal concepts over substantive
ones. The formal rule of law is a necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, condition for
having a rule of law society.
23. Kleinfeld, supra note 8, at 51; see also Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New
Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the 'Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2285-86
(2003).
24. Brooks, supra note 23, at n.50. Friedrich Hayek is thought to espouse the rule of
law theory adopted here by Brooks. See Tamanaha, supra note 11, at 58 (citing FRIEDRICH
A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 206 (1960)).
25. Brooks, supra note 23, at 2289.
26. Carothers, supra note 5, at 16.
27. Brooks, supra note 23, at 2278.
28. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2004).
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economic development to rule of law reform. Yet, despite the plethora of
experts and outpouring of development aid, results have often been
disappointing.2 9 One explanation of why this is the case is offered in the
following sections.
The next two sections discuss rule of law reform efforts and the
challenges that those efforts face. These sections conclude that rule of
law reform will continue to produce lukewarm results unless political
elites adopt the will to enact reforms. In other words, there must be
sincere demand for rule of law reform before the development industry
can assist in the supply, and currently, that demand is lacking. 30
1. Rule of Law Reform
The problem with past rule of law reform efforts is that reformers
tried to promote the formal rule of law by focusing solely on its
institutions, such as legal codes, judiciaries, and police forces. This
furthers the myth that technocratic expertise must rewrite legal codes
to mirror the legal codes of Western societies,31 train judiciaries to think
and act like Western judiciaries, and modernize legal institutions to
make them as efficient as legal institutions in Western societies. 32 Rule
of law reform efforts that embody this myth assume a "build it and they
will come"33 approach, meaning if the "right" formal institutions are in
place, the rule of law will simply emerge. However, good laws are
meaningless if they are not followed or enforced, training the judiciary
or police force is pointless if the incentives for corruption are not
mitigated, and efficient legal institutions are just for show if no one
trusts or uses them.34 While the rule of law does encompass the idea of
transparent and public laws, equal and predictable enforcement, and
accountability, it is more than a set of formal institutions. The fallacy of
this approach is that it ignores the political or cultural element of the
rule of law.35
29. Brooks, supra note 23, at 2280.
30. Fukuyama, for example, expresses reservations about external actors' ability to
create demand for institutions. FUKUYAMA, supra note 28, at 32-42. Carothers also
recognizes that one of the primary obstacles to rule of law reform is a lack of the will to
reform. Carothers, supra note 1, at 4.
31. While there is room for debate as to whether Western societies, like the United
States or Great Britain, exhibit the rule of law as it is defined in this Note, they are
generally thought to be the closest to the norm.
32. See generally Kleinfeld, supra note 8, at 47-54 (discussing the conventional
thinking of practicioners engaged in institution modeling).
33. Golub, supra note 4, at 106; see also STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 17, at 73.
34. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 17, at 76, 178-80.
35. See id. at 75-77; Brooks, supra note 23, at 2284-86.
878
MONEY CAN'T Buy You LAw
The cultural or political element of the rule of law is the relationship
that citizens and political elites have with their legal institutions and
each other; it is a cultural commitment to the law as a guide to behavior
and "the project of law itself."3 6 It is not enough to have a written legal
code; there must also be a social commitment to abide by those laws,
especially on the part of the political elite.3 7 Likewise, it is not enough
that the judiciary is trained to be impartial. Individual judges must
have an incentive to be impartial, which would require, for example,
reducing the substantial political and financial rewards, such as
promotions and bribes, for partial conduct. Lastly, it is not enough for
the judicial process to run efficiently; ordinary citizens must have access
to legal institutions and trust that outcomes will be fair.38 This trust is
only possible if the government and political elite abide by the laws,
especially when it is not in their individual interest to do so. Without
any effort to address the cultural or political elements of the rule of law,
reform efforts will stall.
Addressing this cultural or political element of the rule of law
requires, at a minimum, fostering the will to reform on the part of the
government and political elite.39 While empowering citizens is also a
crucial element of fostering a rule of law culture,40 recalcitrant
government officials and political elites can undermine such
empowerment. The will to reform is more than simply a desire for
reform; it requires political restraint to see such reform through.
2. Challenges to Rule of Law Reform
"[P]eople respond to incentives."4 1 It takes great willpower to resist
the rewards or punishments that incentives deliver. 42 Promoting the
will to reform on the part of political elites, therefore, requires the
difficult task of changing the incentive structures such individuals face.
Some recommendations, for example, have focused on curbing
corruption by increasing salaries in the police and judicial sectors, while
36. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 17, at 75.
37. See Carothers, supra note 1, at 7-8 (explaining that the crucial step in rule of law
reform lies with government officials refraining from placing themselves above the law).
38. See Carothers, supra note 5, at 20-21.
39. Id. at 22.
40. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 17, at 340-46.
41. WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: EcONOMISTS' ADVENTURES
AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TRoPIcs 143 (2002) (arguing that incentives matter for
economic growth).
42. See id. (equating changing incentives to "cutting away brambles" that block one's
path).
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also increasing oversight by state reformers. 43 While these
recommendations are helpful, in practice the implementation of them
has not solved the problem of corruption, in part because "it is
extremely difficult to politely dislodge an ingrained culture of corruption
at the highest levels."44 This is true when the payoff of corruption to the
individual is greater than the potential costs to that individual.45 If the
payoff of political restraint for each individual is minimal, then that
individual will have little incentive to exercise restraint, especially
when no one else exercises such restraint.46 The will to reform,
therefore, suffers from a collective action problem and is further
hampered by the commitment problem, which is characterized by the
resistance to change of those who currently benefit from the status
quo. 4 7 The collective action and commitment problems help to explain
why the will to reform often does not emerge despite the likelihood that,
in the aggregate, society will be better off if systemic corruption is
curbed or government accountability is strengthened.
Formal and informal institutions determine the payoffs and, thus,
the incentives that individuals face. 48 Institutions, in this context, refer
to rules and norms, including political and cultural norms, that act as
constraints on human interaction. Both formal institutions, like written
legal codes and judiciaries, and informal institutions, like the rewards
and punishments of corruption, inform individual action by structuring
incentives. 49 "Institutions consist of formal rules, informal constraints
(norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct) and
the enforcement characteristics of both."5 0 True institutional change,
43. See, e.g., STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 17, at 213, 240-43.
44. Madalene O'Donnell, Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?, in CIVIL WAR AND THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 2, at 240.
45. See id. at 227 ('The single greatest challenge [reformers] face is intense opposition
from political and economic elites who benefit tremendously from corruption.").
46. For a game-theoretic discussion of corruption and collective action, see Jakob
Svensson, Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking, 51 J. IN'L ECON. 437 (2000).
47. See Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Exiting a Lawless State, 118 ECON. J. 1474,
1474-77 (2008) (discussing one type of coordination and commitment problem inherent in
moving to the rule of law from the lawless state). For the idea that collective action can
only succeed when all participants perceive that they are better off under the new
institution than under the status quo-that is, when the new institutions are self-
reinforcing, see Barry R.Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of
Law, 91 AMER. POL. SCI. REv. 245 (1997) (discussing the emergence and sustainability of
political pacts).
48. Douglass C. North, Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis 1 (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://129.3.20.41/eps/eh/papers/9412/9412001.pdf.
49. See DOUGLAsS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3-6 (1990).
50. North, supra note 48, at 2.
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and not window-dressing change, is difficult. "But even more
fundamentally, this institutional evolution takes time."51 "[T]he single
most important point about institutional change, which must be grasped
if we are to begin to get a handle on the subject, is that institutional
change is overwhelmingly incremental." 52 Changes, particularly to
informal constraints, tend to occur gradually because reformers or other
entrepreneurial individuals take advantage of opportunities to
introduce changes at the margin.53 One reason that true change tends to
be at the margin is that the "larger the number of rule changes, ceterus
[sic] paribus[,] the greater the number of losers and hence opposition." 54
Attempts to impose new formal institutions by flat, such as by rewriting
laws or holding formal elections for democratic government, impose new
costs and benefits by changing the formal rules. Those who benefit from
the old institutions face new costs and lose old benefits. Thus, those who
would lose from the new system are likely to mount a strong opposition
to such changes.55 Furthermore, even those who desire such reform may
lack the commitment to it because of the personal rewards inherent in
the old system. This argument helps to explain why there are so many
nominal, rather than true, democracies and why countries with similar
legal codes seem to function so differently.56 As Douglass North
pointedly notes, "Formal rules may change over night, but informal
constraints do not."57
Due to the difficulty of changing the institutions and thus the
incentive structures that political elites face, the will to reform is likely
to occur gradually, if at all, as a result of individuals seeking
51. Deborah Brautigam, Governance, Economy, and Foreign Aid, STUD. COMP. INT'L
DEV., Fall 1992, at 3, 7.
52. NORTH, supra note 49, at 89.
53. Id.
54. North, supra note 48, at 6.
55. Kurt Weyland, Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change, 60 WORLD POL. 281,
288 (2008) ("Since, according to cognitive psychology, losses weigh far more heavily than
gains, [powerful actors] undertake disproportional efforts to defend the status quo."); see
also Hoff & Stiglitz, supra note 47, at 1474 ("It is now well understood that [dysfunctional
institutions] persist if there are politically powerful losers from reform and no way to
promise them compensation credibly.").
56. See NORTH, supra note 49, at 101; Weingast, supra note 47, at 254-55 (providing an
explanation for the differences between democracy in the United States and democracy in
Latin America).
57. North, supra note 48, at 8. For the idea that formal rules are more susceptible to
change than informal, cultural rules, see G4rard Roland, Understanding Institutional
Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-Moving Institutions (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/-groland/pubsgr3.pdf, STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 17,
at 313 (noting that post-intervention societies may be more susceptible to institutional
change due to the breakdown of the "old" institutions).
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opportunities to benefit from change. Until more positive change can be
observed at a societal level, such changes are likely to occur at the
margin, although they can subtly change the costs and benefits all
others face. The change itself may appear to be sudden or drastic, such
as when a dictator unexpectedly agrees to subject himself to a
democratic election, but it can usually be explained by marginal changes
that alter the incentives of the dictator, rendering a seemingly drastic
change less risky than maintaining the status quo.58 If this analysis of
informal institutional change is true, it explains why rule of law reform
efforts have not been successful. Rule of law reform efforts have focused
on one-size-fits-all solutions that are not sensitive to these
entrepreneurial opportunities for real change and ignore the difficulty of
changing informal institutions, cultural and political norms, and the
incentives such institutions naturally create.
The will to reform is difficult to achieve in the best of circumstances,
and very little is known about how to foster it. Working against reform
efforts are elements that support the status quo and undermine the
incentives for change. The next part explores how foreign aid can be one
hindrance to reform.
II. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FOREIGN AID
Foreign aid, whether in the form of Official Development Assistance
(ODA) or conditional loans, presents a further challenge to rule of law
reform because of its potential to perpetuate the negative incentive
structures of government officials and political elites. Naturally, these
consequences are unintended. The stated intent behind foreign aid
efforts is to accelerate economic development and institutional reform,
including rule of law reform.59 Foreign aid is based in part on the
58. See Avner Greif & David D. Laitin, A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change,
98 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 633, 639 (2004) ("[I]nstitutional change should have a quality of
punctuated equilibria, where change is in actuality evolutionary but apparently abrupt,
typically associated with a "crisis" revealing that the previous behavior is no longer an
equilibrium.") (citing Steven Krasner, Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions
and Historical Dynamics, 16 COMP. POL. 223, 223-46 (1984)); Weyland, supra note 55, at
288 ('When a crisis looms, the aggregate benefits arising from a transformation can finally
outweigh the disproportionate concern about losses held by the defenders of the existing
system.").
59. See, e.g., Margareta Sollenberg, Aid Dependence and Armed Conflict: A Re-
Examination of the Evidence 2 (June 11, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.prio.no/upload/cscw/wg3/GROW%20net%2OWorkshop/Sollenberg%2OAid&Conf
lict%20090604%20(Oslo).pdf ("Although aid is meant to be solely beneficial for the
recipient country, the aid community as well as the research community has long been
aware of the possibility that aid may sometimes do harm, despite the donors' good
intentions.").
882
MONEY CAN'T Buy You LAW 883
premise that it is difficult for developing countries to make needed
reforms without the help of the developed world, particularly without
their financial assistance. William Easterly has called this the "white
man's burden," and it is the idea that even though much of the
developed world has advanced without outside assistance, the
developing world cannot do the same.60 With the white man's burden
deeply ingrained in the minds of Western aid agencies, people have only
recently begun to question this assumption and consider whether they
are doing more harm than good.61
A survey of recent economic literature, primarily focused on the
effects of foreign aid on economic development, reveals that foreign aid
can undermine rule of law reform by reducing the costs of maintaining
the status quo. In other words, foreign aid may hinder the emergence of
a cultural or political commitment to the rule of law, particularly on the
part of the political elite. If the cultural or political elements of the rule
of law require political accountability to the rule of law and a
commitment to maintaining a well-ordered society, then foreign aid can
undermine that by thwarting the emergence of democracy and
democratic accountability, 62 decreasing the quality of governance,68 and
60. WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS TO AID
THE REST HAVE DONE So MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD 23-26 (2006). "The White Man's
Burden emerged from the West's self-pleasing fantasy that 'we' were the chosen ones to
save the Rest. The White Man offered himself the starring role in an ancien regime
version of Harry Potter." Id. at 23.
61. The white man's burden is obviously a caricature to some extent, though it is an
apt description of some of the imperialist elements found in the development literature. Of
course, it may also be the case that the developed world simply believes they can
accelerate the development of the developing world through development assistance. Still,
even this premise is challenged by the failure of development in many countries that have
been the primary focus of development assistance.
62. See, e.g., Stephen Knack, Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?, 48 INT'L STUD. Q.
251-66 (2004) (arguing there is no evidence to suggest foreign aid, in the aggregate,
successfully promotes democracy).
63. E.g., Simeon Djankov et al., The Curse of Aid, 13 J. ECON. GROWTH 169 (2008);
Brautigam, supra note 51, at 21 (arguing that "participatory dialogue between
governments and their private sector, rather than between governments and donors" is
more likely to yield effective property rights and accountability); Stephen Knack, Aid
Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests, 68 S. EcoN. J.
310, 310 (2001) (discussing evidence that "higher aid levels erode the quality of
governance, as measured by indices of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of
law"); Raghuram Rajan & Arvind Subramanian, Does Aid Affect Governance?, 97 AM.
ECON. REv. 322, 322 (2007) (arguing that "countries that get more aid are likely to be the
ones where [the quality of governance] is most adversely affected"); Svensson, supra note
46, at 437 (finding "no evidence that ... donors systematically allocate aid to countries
with less corruption"). But see Jos4 Tavares, Does Foreign Aid Corrupt?, 79 EcON.
LETTERS 99 (2003) (producing a study that shows that aid decreases corruption).
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:2
encouraging violent conflict or civil war.64 Each of these effects is a
roadblock to the will to reform. The following sections discuss the
impact of foreign aid on rule of law reform, focusing, in particular, on
impediments like corruption, poor governance, and the lack of
democratic accountability that foreign aid can create.
A. Incentives for Rent Seeking and Corruption
The role of governance in reform efforts cannot be overemphasized.
"Good governance-in the form of institutions that establish a
predictable, impartial, and consistently enforced set of rules . . .- is
crucial for sustained and rapid growth in per capita incomes of poor
countries."65 Not only is good governance, as defined above, good for
economic growth, but it is also synonymous with certain aspects of the
formal rule of law theory.66 While ODA, in theory, could promote good
governance and the rule of law by increasing salaries and reducing
corruption or by training the police and the judiciary, the unintended
consequences of aid may overshadow any positive returns in these
areas.67
Instead of promoting good governance, foreign aid can skew the
incentives of governments and political elites.6 8 As one economic study
reveals: "Analyses of cross-country data provide evidence that higher
aid levels erode the quality of governance, as measured by indices of
64. See, e.g., Manuel Oechslin, Foreign Aid, Political Instability, and Economic Growth 1
(U. Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research Econ., Working Paper No. 310, 2006), available at
https//editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conferenceldownload.cgi?db-name-res2007&paper-id=489
(arguing that "more money in the hands of the regime fuels conflict over the distribution of
funds"); Sollenberg, supra note 59, at 3 (finding that "aid dependence does increase the
probability of armed conflict). But see Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Aid, Policy and Peace:
Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict, 13 DEF. & PEACE EcON. 435, 435 (2002) (finding "that aid
and policy do not have direct effects upon conflict risk"); Joppe de Ree & Eleonora Nillesen,
Aiding Violence or Peace? The Impact of Foreign Aid on the Risk of Civil Conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 88 J. DEv. EcoN. 301, 301 (2009) (finding that "increasing aid flows tends to
decrease civil conflict duration"). The methodology of the Collier and Hoeffier article should be
questioned, however, since it measured the effect of economic policy and foreign aid on the
risk of conflict. It is unclear then what effect aid alone has on such risk. Still, because the
relationship between aid and conflict is ambiguous, it is omitted from discussion here.
65. Knack, supra note 63, at 311.
66. See supra notes 12-13, 21-25 and accompanying text.
67. For a similar argument about foreign aid and democratization, see Knack, supra
note 62, at 251.
68. For an argument linking foreign aid to the incentives of government officials, and
in particular arguing that foreign aid, in the form of unconditional monetary transfers,
decreases the incentives to institute "good policies," see Alberto Dalmazzo & Guido de
Blasio, Resources and Incentives to Reform, 50 IMF STAFF PAPERS 250 (2003).
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bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law."69 One reason for
this is that foreign aid can be seen as a large prize to be won.70 Whoever
controls the government also controls the money. Thus, a moral hazard
problem results in that the people who end up in power tend not to be
the same people who have sincere reform efforts in mind.71 As another
study points out, "[h]igh levels of aid in countries where the political
leadership does not have reform on the agenda are likely to reduce the
incentive to cooperate in the sacrifices necessary for reform to occur."72
Rule of law reform, which seeks to build a society in which government
officials and political elites abide by laws, runs counter to the power-as-
prize mentality because reform requires collective sacrifice on the part
of political elites, who must eschew personal gain for the public good.73
The collective sacrifice requirement suffers from a quintessential
prisoner's dilemma problem in that it is always in the individual's self-
interest to promote personal gain and thus not make sacrifices,
regardless of whether anyone else does.74 The result is the equilibrium
position in which few political elites or government officials are
prepared to make the sacrifices necessary for reform.75
Foreign aid also represents a potential source of rents, which is a
way for the political elite to maintain power.76 It is often easier to
remain in power by patronage rather than by reform. "Political elites
69. Knack, supra note 63, at 310.
70. See Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less
Foreign Aid? 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7108, 1999) (citing
Philip Lane & Aaron Tornell, The Voracity Effect, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (1999)).
71. For example, Stephen Knack notes that "[a]id may also encourage coup attempts
and political instability, by making control of the government and aid receipts a more
valuable prize, reducing the prospects for democratic governance. It is widely
acknowledged that violent competition for control over large-scale food aid contributed to
the breakdown of government in Somalia." Knack, supra note 62, at 253 (finding overall
that aid has no positive or negative effect on democracy in recipient governments).
72. Deborah A. Brautigam & Stephen Knack, Foreign Aid, Institutions, and
Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 52 ECON. DEV. & CuLTuRAL CHANGE 255, 263 (2004).
73. Id. at 256.
74. For an overview of the prisoner's dilemma problem, see Steven Kuhn, Prisoner's
Dilemma, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2009),
available at http://plato.stanford.edularchives/spr2009/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.
75. One study by George Economides, Sarantis Kalyvitis, and Apostolis Philippopoulos
finds that "the deleterious effect of aid upon incentives ... is significant only in recipient
countries with relatively large public sectors. This confirms the popular belief that rent
seeking and corruption take place mainly through government activities . . . ." Does
Foreign Aid Distort Incentives and Hurt Growth? Theory and Evidence from 75 Aid-
Recipient Countries, 134 PUB. CHOICE 463, 464 (2008). In those countries with large public
sectors, "foreign aid makes ... a cooperative solution [i.e., one without rent seeking] more
difficult to sustain." Id. at 484.
76. Knack, supra note 63, at 313.
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have little incentive to change a situation in which large amounts of aid
provide exceptional resources for patronage and many fringe benefits
(vehicles, study tours, salary increments, etc.) that would not otherwise
be available to officials in low-income countries."77 Reform is often
painful and unpopular with those who benefit from the status quo. The
incentive for reform is lessened when power can be retained by force or
patronage without having to make unpopular reforms. Even for reform-
minded elites, the incentive to forestall reform is great; "it is in the
interests of all actors today to continue the benefits they get from ...
receiving aid, even though this aid will create problems for future
governments."78 Given that most government officials and political
elites have short time horizons,79 it is easier to leave real reform for the
next government and to take advantage of the present, personal gains
from aid as they come.80
Lastly, foreign aid increases the opportunity for corruption,
meaning "the illegal use of public office for private gain."8 1 Corruption
may be blatant, like the diversion of foreign aid to private Swiss bank
accounts, 82 but corruption also occurs when aid money is used to provide
government positions for cronies or political allies or fund projects
supported by the political elites.83 Despite arguments that aid can
reduce corruption by raising the salaries of government officials, an
empirical study reveals that countries that receive more aid tend to
have higher corruption.84 While it may be difficult to make a conclusive
causal argument that aid causes corruption, a potential endogeneity
problem is minimized because there is little risk that increased
corruption causes increased aid flows. 85
Again, there is a collective action problem involved with reducing
corruption. Considering the incentives of political elites to eschew
corruption through a prisoner's dilemma choice set, each individual
maximizes his self-interest by engaging in corrupt behavior in both
77. Brautigam & Knack, supra note 72, at 263.
78. Id. at 265.
79. Knack, supra note 63, at 311. For an argument that foreign aid may decrease the
time horizon of governments by increasing potential for conflict over the distribution of
funds, see Oechslin, supra note 64.
80. For the proposition that aid reduces the cost of "doing nothing-that is, avoiding
reform," see Dani Rodrik, Understanding Economic Policy Reform, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 9, 30-
31 (1996).
81. Brautigam, supra note 51, at 13 (citing ROBIN THEOBALD, CORRUPTION,
DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1990)).
82. See Todd Moss & Arvind Subramanian, After the Big Push? Fiscal and Institutional
Implications of Large Aid Increases 7 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 71, 2005).
83. Knack, supra note 63, at 313.
84. Alesina & Weder, supra note 70, at 20.
85. Id. at 6-7.
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scenarios: (1) if everyone else resists corrupt behavior, or (2) if everyone
else engages in corrupt behavior. The decision set is identical for each
actor. Thus, the equilibrium behavior is corruption, rather than
restraint.86
Given the incentives governments face, the ineffectiveness of aid to
improve governance should not be surprising. One of the problems with
foreign aid or rule of law aid is that once the laws are rewritten and the
judiciary is trained, reformers in aid agencies do not promote
sustainable reform efforts.87 If the aid continues despite the lack of real
reform, recipient governments will do just enough to guarantee a
continued flow of revenue. Real reform, however, can only go so far with
a carrot-and-stick enforcement policy. Real reform also requires a
commitment to reform even when no one is watching. It has been noted
that "[tihe single greatest challenge [reformers] face is intense
opposition from political and economic elites who benefit tremendously
from corruption."88 Rule of law reformers still do not know how to build
the normative commitment to rule of law reform. Perhaps, there is no
easy way to do so. In the meantime, the commitment is undermined by
the subsidization of the status quo provided by foreign aid.
86. In the traditional prisoner's dilemma scenario, there are two suspects who each
face the choice of testifying against the other or remaining silent. If both suspects remain
silent, there is not enough evidence to charge them with the serious offense and they will
each get six months in prison. However, if one testifies and the other remains silent, the
one that testifies will go free, while the other will be sentenced to ten years in prison. If
both suspects testify against the other, they will both get five years. Because each suspect
risks going to prison for ten years if he stays silent, each suspect will testify against the
other. As a result, each will get a five-year sentence. Both would be better off if they can
agree to keep silent, but they cannot coordinate their actions.
The collective action problem for corruption is similar in that without a disincentive to
engage in corruption, each political elite would maximize his self-interest by defecting,
and taking bribes, than from agreeing to eschew corruption, even if all of the other
political elites agree to eschew corruption. Because each political elite gains from defecting
on any agreement, the equilibrium is corruption.
For an example of this type of game-theoretic response to foreign aid, see Svensson, supra
note 46. Svensson concludes that this result is more prominent in societies that are
politically or culturally divided. Id. at 455.
87. The stories of aid projects rendered useless without continued monitoring on the
part of the aid agencies are countless. See, e.g., MICHAEL MAREN, THE ROAD TO HELL: THE
RAVAGING EFFECTS OF FOREIGN AID AND INTERNATIONAL CHARITY (1997). Aid agencies
need to monitor these projects because none of the agencies' efforts reach the human
element or the will to reform. With the will to reform, no oversight would be required.
88. O'Donnell, supra note 44, at 227.
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B. Thwarting the Emergence of Democratic Governance
Perhaps the most notable and widely discussed consequence of
foreign aid stems from its effect on democracy and democratic
accountability. Rentier state theory, originally modeled to explain why
oil-rich Middle Eastern states tend to be authoritarian, argues that
countries that rely predominantly on external rents, like oil profits or
foreign aid, are less accountable to civil society than are governments
that must rely on tax revenue.89 The argument against foreign aid is
that by producing external rents, the state can function without the
need to tax its citizens.90 As the flip side of the Revolutionary War
slogan, "no taxation without representation," the idea of "no
representation without taxation" might be equally compelling. While
most recipient governments do tax their citizens to some extent, tax
collection efforts are often grossly inefficient. Foreign aid reduces the
pressure to introduce tax reform. Indeed, "[s]eventy-one percent of the
African countries receiving more than 10% of GDP in aid in 1995 were
also in the group of countries judged in an IMF study to have lower than
expected tax effort."91
Historians and political scientists have argued that the demand for
representation in government arose in response to the sovereign's
attempts to raise taxes. 92 Essentially, the sovereign's need for revenue
forced it into the bargaining process with citizens.93 Without the
pressure of raising revenue, the bargaining position of citizens is
diminished.
The "taxation produces representation" claim is most
commonly invoked today by Middle East specialists who
reason that the ability of the region's autocrats to
finance themselves with non-tax revenues-primarily
through oil revenues-has enabled them to avoid
pressures to democratize. . . . [T]he discovery of oil
allowed the governments of Kuwait and Qatar to stop
taxing their merchant classes; relieved of taxes, the
89. Michael Lewin Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy? 53 WORLD POL. 325, 329-32
(2001).
90. See Djankov et al., supra note 63, at 3.
91. Brautigam & Knack, supra note 72, at 264.
92. Ross, supra note 89, at 332-33. For an argument that the sources of state revenue
may have a major impact on governance in developing countries, see Mick Moore,
Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries, 25
INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 297 (2004).
93. See Michael L. Ross, Does Taxation Lead to Representation?, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
229, 230-32 (2004).
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merchants relinquished their historically-established
right to participate in policy making. Similarly, . . . a
drop in foreign aid and remittances in the 1980s forced
the Jordanian government to depend more heavily on
taxes: from 1987 to 1992, the ratio of taxes to gross
domestic product (GDP) rose from 0.13 to 0.24. Rising
taxes and falling subsidies led to riots in April 1989, a
revision in the election laws, and following a November
1989 vote, a more open, representative and influential
parliament.9 4
The idea is that, like citizens of oil-rich countries, citizens of
countries in which foreign aid makes up a significant portion of revenue
will also have less bargaining power vis-a-vis the state. Less bargaining
power translates into fewer mechanisms to hold the government
accountable and less democratic representation.95
The "taxation produces representation" theory holds that, all other
things being equal, higher taxes will tend to produce greater
accountability and democratic representation. This is because higher
taxes create an incentive for citizens to put pressure on the government
and demand greater accountability and respect for the rule of law. The
government's need for revenue gives citizens a position at the
bargaining table. However, higher taxes coupled with a greater
provision and quality of government services might not produce these
same results. The reason is that "[bloth the size of the tax burden, and
the quality and quantity of government spending matter; citizens
ultimately care about the 'price' they pay for the government services
they receive."96 If citizens feel the benefits of government services
outweigh the costs, their incentive to demand change decreases. Thus,
the resulting theory is that higher taxes, without a complementary
improvement in government services, will result in greater government
accountability and democratic representation as a result of increased
pressure by citizens on the state. "People may dislike taxes," Michael
Ross notes, "and indeed they loathe paying more while receiving less
from their governments. Ironically, [though,] this loathing may be a
good thing: when citizens are faced with an undemocratic government
that is charging unreasonably high prices for its services, they tend to
demand democratic reforms."97
94. Id. at 232-33.
95. See generally id. 233-34.
96. Id. at 234.
97. Id. at 248.
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Foreign aid, like oil, is a measure that helps authoritarian
governments lower the price of government services, thereby increasing
services for the same price or decreasing the price for the same
services.98 Either one of these results has antidemocratic effects since it
decreases citizens' incentives to demand changes and decreases citizens'
bargaining position vis-A-vis the government.
Unlike oil or other natural resources, foreign aid does not fall from
the heavens nor spew from the earth, like manna. Because foreign aid
has its source in human agents, it is necessary to consider those agents'
role. When a government taxes its citizens, it is in some way
accountable to them to produce the expected results. Since foreign aid
bypasses or decreases the government's need to tax citizens,
governments become less accountable to their citizens. Instead,
government officials become accountable to foreign donors:
When aid transfers reach ten percent or more of total
GNP (as they did for at least 24 countries in 1989) and
exceed total current revenue from other sources, those
with the loudest single voice . . . are international
lending agencies. 9
So, the question becomes: do international lending agents keep
governments accountable? In particular, do international lending agents
keep governments accountable to rule of law reform?
The simple answer to this question is no, but the reasons for this are
more complex than the answer. Understanding why lending agents fail
to keep governments accountable to the rule of law requires
understanding the multidimensional, principal-agent relationship
lurking behind this interaction. In the idealized citizen-state
relationship, the citizens are the principals. They are the owners of the
valuable resources and revenues that are transferred to the agent,
namely the state, through taxation. In the case of foreign aid, instead of
the citizens, the principals are the international lenders, while the
agent is the recipient state. On this one dimension, then, the recipient
state is accountable to the aid agencies. The story is more complicated,
however, because the aid agencies themselves are agents for yet other
principals, namely the citizens in the donor countries whose tax dollars
fund the agencies. 00 Moreover, the aid agencies rely on the presumption
that the recipient governments are agents of their citizens, as
98. Id. at 247; see also Djankov et al., supra note 63, at 3.
99. Brautigam, supra note 51, at 11 (citing WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1991, at 242 (1991)).
100. EASTERLY, supra note 60, at 169.
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principals. Bertin Martens refers to this multidimensional principal-
agent relationship as a "broken feedback loop" because there are no
smooth channels in this relationship for proper feedback. 101
The lack of feedback between the recipient government and its
citizens has already been discussed, but what about the feedback
between the recipient government and aid agencies? If citizens cannot
induce the government or political elites to work toward rule of law
reforms, can aid agencies? The problem here is that aid agencies have
an incentive to continue producing output (i.e., increase grants and
loans), regardless of whether the recipient governments reform. 102 The
reason is that the principals to the aid agency-donor relationship are
the citizens in donor countries, and these citizens have almost no ability
to monitor the effect of aid on rule of law reform, particularly on the will
to reform.103 As a result, the success of the aid agencies is measured by
the volume of input-money given, in other words-as opposed to
output or real reform. 104 To highlight this fact, instead of complaining
about the trillions of dollars of aid that has been given without any
remarkable change in the rule of law or economic well-being in the
recipient countries, the rhetoric in donor countries is that more aid is
needed. Several influential celebrities, most notably Bono,105 as well as
prominent academics, such as Columbia University professor Jeffrey
Sachs, 106 believe that doubling aid to poor countries will somehow
produce a different result than the first few trillion.107 Citizens in the
donor countries "love the Big Plans, the promises of easy solutions, the
utopian dreams, [and] the side benefits for rich-country political or
101. See generally BERTIN MARTENS ET AL., THE INSTITUTIONAL EcONOMIcS OF FOREIGN
AID, at viii-9 (2002). See also William Easterly, Was Development Assistance a Mistake? 97
AM. EcON. REv. 328, 330 (2007) ("Unlike the provision of domestic public goods in
democracies, the recipient of aid-financed public services has no ability to register
dissatisfaction through voting. With little or no feedback from the poor, there is little
information as to which aid programs are working.").
102. See generally Jakob Svensson, Why Conditional Aid Does Not Work and What Can
Be Done About It?, 70 J. DEV. ECON. 381, 398 (2003) ("[There is a strong bias towards
'always' disbursing aid to the ex ante designated recipient, irrespective of that recipient's
performance. . . .").
103. EASTERLY, supra note 60, at 170-71.
104. Id. at 181-83.
105. Bono has been an influential part of the Live 8 concert series. The message of the
Live 8 movement is to "make poverty history." As part of the program, 30 million people
provided their names to a list presented to then-Prime Minister Tony Blair in order to
influence Great Britain's foreign aid efforts in Africa. See http://www.live8ive.com.
106. See JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: EcoNOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME
(2005) (Bono wrote the foreword for this book and has traveled extensively with Professor
Sachs throughout Africa).
107. EASTERLY, supra note 60, at 170.
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economic interests, all of which hands the aid agency impossible
tasks."08 More importantly, they are more than willing to take on the
white man's burden without demanding observable results. Thus, the
aid agencies lack the incentives to demand those results from recipient
countries, especially since, as this Note has argued, real results are
difficult to achieve.
The other problem with aid agencies' incentives is that their
continued existence depends on the premise that foreign aid can
produce reform. If foreign aid is anathema to reform, the aid agency has
no purpose and will not continue to be funded. As a result, agencies
have an incentive not to give up on the hope that aid can bring reform
and growth. This hope has spurred new trends and theories on how to
make aid work for developing countries, including directing aid toward
countries with better institutions and using economic sanctions to
threaten governments and political elites into reform. While these
efforts almost certainly result in some improvements, the unintended
negative effects of aid overshadow those improvements, leaving many
countries worse off after fifty years of development aid than they were
before. 09 This unfortunate conclusion is especially prominent on the
African continent.
III. THE EXPERIMENT IN AFRICA
Over the past 42 years, over 500 billion dollars in foreign aid has
been funneled to Africa.110 However, little progress has been made in
many African countries, particularly in economic development and rule
of law reform. This is especially true in the African countries that can be
labeled "aid dependent" (a label that means ten percent or more of a
country's GDP comes from external revenue sources)."' Foreign aid
alone, however, does not explain the relative absence of the rule of law
in many aid-dependent African countries, since many of these countries
came into existence with relatively poor legal and political institutions.
Instead, the argument is that foreign aid perpetuates the continued
existence of these poor institutions by removing the incentive to engage
in real reform. The following subsection presents a theory about why
many African countries have weak rule of law cultures. If this theory is
accurate, it highlights the reason why foreign aid may undermine the
development of rule of law cultures in these countries. This theory is
108. Id. at 169.
109. THOMAS W. DICHTER, DESPITE GOOD INTENTIONS: WHY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
TO THE THIRD WORLD HAS FAILED 2 (2003).
110. Easterly, supra note 101, at 329.
111. See Brautigam & Knack, supra note 72, at 257.
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also bolstered by the empirical data on sub-Saharan Africa surveyed in
the previous part,112 which is where most of the aid-dependent African
countries are found.
A. African Institutions: An Explanation for the Weak Rule of Law
Culture in Much of Sub-Saharan Africa
In his book, Indigenous African Institutions, Ghanaian economist
George Ayittey explores the nature of precolonial African institutions.11s
Ayittey found that precolonial or indigenous African societies did not
necessarily have weak rule of law cultures. 114 In fact, many such
societies evidenced indigenous dispute resolution institutions, including
informal courts complete with rights of appeal. 115 In much of precolonial
Africa, however, indigenous courts stressed "reconciliation and the
promotion of social harmony," as opposed to strict fidelity to abstract
legal codes.116 Indigenous African courts also encouraged public
participation, thereby increasing social harmony and compliance with
the outcome of the case.117 While fidelity to abstract legal codes may
have been lacking, indigenous African legal institutions were most often
based on customary law that represented long-established, socially
accepted norms.118 The political or cultural elements of the rule of law
can be evidenced in these indigenous institutions. For example, in
Segment v. Makgala Kopo, "a man who had forcibly attacked another's
household goods to secure payment of a debt was fined two head of
cattle, because, said the chief, 'the law (native law) is that a person
should not seize from another but must bring him to the chief."'1 9 This
case, as one of many Ayittey cited, illustrates his conclusion that
indigenous African legal institutions required disputes to be settled
through the legal system, based on well established and socially
accepted rules, which is further evidence of the cultural commitment to
the rule of law.
If Ayittey accurately describes the state of many indigenous African
institutions, then it is relevant to ask: what went wrong? Ayittey's
theory, which garners further support in the literature,120 places the
112. See supra Part II.
113. See generally GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, INDIGENOUs AFRIcAN INSTITUlONS (1991).
114. Id. at 39-149.
115. Id. at 40-41.
116. Id. at 67.
117. Id. at 67-68.
118. Id. at 60-66.
119. Id. at 60.
120. See, e.g., Pierre Englebert, Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and
Economic Development in Tropical Africa, 53 POL. RES. Q. 7 (2000) ("[Vlariations in the
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blame on the shoulders of the colonial powers and the postcolonial
independent governments that succeeded these indigenous
institutions. 121 The theory is that poor institutions are the result of a
conflict or disconnect between the colonial and postcolonial transplanted
institutions and the indigenous institutions.122 When the postcolonial
independent governments strongly conflicted with the precolonial
indigenous institutions, the theory states that governments resorted to
"neo-patrimonial strategies of power with their attendant propensity for
corruption, clientelism, nepotism, or regionalism"123 to remain in power.
Neo-patrimonial institutions are characterized by the presence of a
central figure-a "big man," a President, or a father figure-who uses
state resources to secure the loyalty of citizen "clients" and who sees the
office of President as a means of personal aggrandizement.124 "Neo-
patrimonial policies are .. . the equilibrium outcome of illegitimate post-
colonial statehood, a condition which entails a dichotomization of power
and state structures."125
This theory is buttressed by its ability to explain the differences in
the existence of neo-patrimonialism among sub-Saharan African
countries. In countries such as Botswana, in which the postcolonial
government was coextensive with the precolonial institutional
structure, neo-patrimonial activities are minimized. 26 By contrast, in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), where the
postcolonial state replaced separate state systems and nonstate
societies, and where the borders of the postcolonial state divided
precolonial political cultures,127 political conflict and neo-patrimonial,
extent to which post-colonial state institutions clash with pre-existing ones largely
account for what differentiates state capacity and economic growth across the region. The
greater the incongruence between pre- and post-colonial institutions, the greater the
relative power payoffs to domestic elites of adopting neo-patrimonial policies over
developmental ones.").
121. AYITTEY, supra note 113, at xv-xxiii.
122. See Englebert, supra note 120.
123. Id. at 12.
124. See, e.g., id. at 9; Nicolas van de Walle, Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's
Emerging Party Systems, 41 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 297, 309-13 (2003) (using the terms
"presidentialism" and "clientelism" in essentially the same way as "neo-patrimonialism').
125. Englebert, supra note 120, at 12.
126. Id. at 13-14. Englebert finds that the precolonial government in Botswana was
firmly established prior to colonization. Id. In fact, Botswana's precolonial authorities
requested the establishment of a British protectorate, fearing encroachment of the Boer
settlers from South Africa. Id. at 13. Because of this, there was little or no chasm between
the pre- and postcolonial state. Id. at 14.
127. Id. at 13.
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"strong man" rule is at its most salient. 128
If the disjunct between the modern state, with its formal
institutions, and the indigenous institutions produces such a neo-
patrimonial power structure, it is hardly surprising that the rule of law
is weak in countries that exhibit such behavior. By its definition, neo-
patrimonialism presumes the President or big man is above the law.
Neo-patrimonial regimes "are highly presidential, in the sense that
power is centralized around a single individual, with ultimate control
over most clientelist networks."129 These clientelist networks include
"patronage, various forms of rent-seeking, and prebendalism.""s0 This
type of power structure is anathema to the rule of law. It is also
resistant to reform because real reform requires the participation of
government officials and the political elite. However, when political
power depends on the patronage system-employing corruption and
rent seeking behavior and lacking accountability to the citizenry and
the rule of law-no rule of law reform is likely to occur.
Part II of this Note emphasized how foreign aid organizations
provide perverse incentives to resist reform by subsidizing the status
quo. It illustrated how foreign aid can have an adverse effect on the
quality of governance, as measured by corruption and the rule of law,
and how it can thwart the emergence of democratic accountability. If
legal, political, and cultural institutions of many sub-Saharan African
countries are already plagued by poor governance and a lack of
democratic accountability, adding foreign aid to the mix has the
potential to entrench these policies even more deeply, making reform
less, rather than more, likely.11
This short history of rule of law institutions in Africa reveals a
partial explanation for the continent's poor rule of law record: the
displacement of rule of law institutions and norms by colonial and
postcolonial powers. Foreign aid, however, provides another part of this
story; foreign aid has the potential to exacerbate the situation by
subsidizing the status quo and decreasing the incentives toward
government reform and democratic accountability. The following section
provides a survey of empirical data from sub-Saharan Africa that shows
this potential has largely been realized.
128. For a detailed examination of "strong man" politics in many postcolonial African
nations, see generally MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA: A HISTORY OF FIFTY
YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE (2005).
129. NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, AFRICAN ECNONES AND THE POLITICS OF PERMANENT
CRISIS, 1979-1999, at 52 (2001).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 58-60.
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B. The Effects of Foreign Aid on the Weak Institutions in Sub-Saharan
Africa
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa can be classified as aid-
dependent.132 If the theory presented in the previous section is accurate,
empirical data should reveal that foreign aid has decreased, or at least
failed to increase, the quality of governance in these countries. It should
also reveal that foreign aid has decreased, or at least failed to improve,
democratic accountability in these countries. Both the quality of
governance and democratic accountability are proxies for the rule of law
and, in particular, the cultural or political commitment to the rule of
law. Poor institutions, including those marred by poor governance and a
lack of democratic accountability, are not only proxies for the lack of the
rule of law, but they also make the will to reform less likely.
132. Between 2000 and 2008, twenty-three sub-Saharan African countries received an
average of ODA as a percentage of GDP greater than or equal to ten percent. See ADB
Socio-Economic Database, AFR. DEV. BANK, http://afdbdp.prognoz.com/DataAnalysis.aspx
(last visited Feb. 6, 2011) (click "Data Analysis" on the left-hand column; under the title
"Fixed" on the left-hand column, click the drop-down box labeled "Indicators"; select the
"Financial Flows" arrow; choose "Net Total ODA/OA (In % of GDP)").
Country Average ODA (as % of GDP)
Burkina Faso 13.42
Burundi 37.92
Cape Verde 14.41
Congo, Dem. Rep. 25.33
Djibouti 12.09
Eritrea 24.21
Ethiopia 14.70
Gambia 13.79
Ghana 11.06
Guinea-Bissau 32.22
Liberia 58.75
Rwanda 20.85
Madagascar 12.93
Malawi 20.97
Mali 13.03
Mauritania 16.13
Mozambique 25.35
Niger 14.60
Sao Tome & Principe 32.46
Sierra Leone 31.54
Tanzania 12.67
Uganda 12.75
Zambia 16.11
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A look at some of the empirical studies that focus on sub-Saharan
Africa shows that foreign aid does not have a positive effect on the
quality of governance, corruption, and democratic accountability in
Africa. A study conducted by Deborah Brautigam and Stephen Knack
tested the effect of aid dependence on the quality of governance in sub-
Saharan Africa and measured it by subjective indices from the
International Country Risk Guide, which is a commercial service
providing information on political risks to overseas investors. They also
tested the effect of aid on the tax collection effort of sub-Saharan African
countries. Their results "show that in Africa, higher aid levels are
associated with larger declines in the quality of governance and in tax
revenues as a share of GDP."13 3 Moreover, when they corrected for the
potential endogeneity of aid, recognizing that "causality can go in either
direction, as donors may respond (either favorably or unfavorably) to an
observed deterioration in governance," 134 they found "an even stronger
relationship between aid levels and declines in the quality of governance
and in the tax share of GDP."as The results of Brautigam and Knack's
study remains significant when they control "for economic decline and
political violence, [which are] two factors that might also affect
governance and tax collections,"136 signaling the role of aid on the poor
governance in many sub-Saharan African countries. Finally, there is no
conclusive evidence that aid was less damaging to governance in
recipient nations after the development industry began implementing
programs that targeted corruption, strengthened tax administration,
and supported democratization, than before the advent of the reforms. 137
The studies surrounding the effects of foreign aid on democratic
accountability are more opaque. Democratic accountability is itself
difficult to measure. The fact that a government holds regular elections
does not necessarily speak to the fairness of those elections or the
government's willingness to conform to the results of the election if the
incumbent loses.138 Moreover, regular elections, even if fair and subject
to real opposition, do not reveal whether citizens have any power to hold
governments accountable to the rule of law or its reform. While recent
studies have shown a slight positive effect of aid on democracy, these
results must be qualified. In one study, Arthur Goldsmith found "small
133. Brautigam & Knack, supra note 72, at 266.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 275.
138. See generally ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT:
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950-1990, at 15-18 (2000).
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positive relationships between aid and indicators of democracy." 139
However, the study measures democracy by the Freedom House rating
system of "free," "partly free," and "not free," "based on an index of how
much liberty citizens have to organize themselves for common purposes,
to persuade others of their opinions, and to compete for political
influence."140 Unfortunately, seven of the twenty-three aid-dependent
countries, as identified by the African Development Bank, fall under the
category "not free," while only four fall under the category "free."141 Yet
even this measurement cannot capture the idea of whether the
governments in any of these countries are accountable to their citizens
or whether citizens have a real effect on government policies, as true
democratic accountability requires.142 Moreover, other research on the
democratic situation in sub-Saharan Africa paints a less-than-rosy
picture of the nature of democratic elections.143 As Said Adejumobi
notes:
In most African countries, recent developments suggest
that elections are only an expedient political exercise for
ruling regimes, partly because of their economic
implications in terms of external aid flows and economic
assistance, and partly because of their public relations
advantage in propping up the political profile of the
regime in the international arena.144
139. Arthur A. Goldsmith, Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa, 55 INT'L ORG. 123, 144
(2001).
140. Id. at 128-30.
141. See id. at 129-31. Burundi, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Gambia,
Mauritania, Niger, and Rwanda are classified as "not free," whereas Cape Verde, Malawi,
Mali, and Sao Tome & Principe are classified as "free." The remaining countries are
classified as "partly free." Goldsmith's data comes from the late 1990s. In the 2010 report,
Malawi has been downgraded from "free" to "partly free." However, Burundi, Djibouti,
Gambia, and Niger have been upgraded to "partly free." The remaining countries are
classified as "partly free." FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (2010), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiwlO/CombinedAverageRatings(IndependentCount
ries)FIW201O.pdf.
142. The chart Goldsmith provides shows that even those governments rated "free" by
Freedom House exhibited periods of "internal wars and state failures," "deaths from
political violence," "refugees," and "coup events." Goldsmith, supra note 139, at 129-30.
143. See, e.g., Said Adejumobi, Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy?, 21
INT'L POL. Sol. REV. 59, 59 (2000) (arguing that the structure and process of elections in
most African states "remain largely perverted").
144. Id. at 66.
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Stories of rigging elections, stifling opposition parties, and terrorizing
citizenry abound in many of these countries. 145 More telling, perhaps, is
that there are no unqualified studies purporting to hold that foreign aid
has had a direct positive effect on democratic accountability, as opposed
to an effect on the existence of multiparty elections.
CONCLUSION
It is the presumption of the development industry that foreign aid
can promote rule of law reform by providing the resources necessary to
rewrite formal legal codes, train judiciaries and police forces, and
introduce technology that may help legal institutions function more
efficiently. This Note has highlighted both theoretical and empirical
evidence as to why foreign aid has failed to lead to rule of law reform in
many countries. The fundamental problem the development industry
overlooks is the lack of incentives for developing countries' government
officials and political elites to aid in the reformation of the rule of law.
An important aspect that is also often overlooked is that true rule of law
reform will not be sustainable without a social commitment to abide by
the rule of law, especially on the part of government officials and the
political elite. The development industry has thus far failed to develop
the underlying institutions that create this social commitment.
Contrary to what the development industry intends to achieve by
offering foreign aid, aid often has the unintended consequence of
subsidizing present institutions, thereby postponing the need to make
necessary reforms. An influx of aid money provides few incentives for
political elites to commit themselves to the sacrifices required for real
reform and democratic accountability, and it enables the elite to remain
in power without such reform.
While this Note has presented a pessimistic view of foreign aid and
its ability to accelerate rule of law reform in developing countries, its
arguments are limited to the way in which foreign aid is currently
delivered. The challenges, however, are great. Previous attempts to
attach conditions for reform on development assistance have failed to
engender true reform, precisely because the parties on both sides-
government officials, political elites, and the aid agents themselves-
face incentives contrary to the end goal. The aid agents face incentives
to continue giving aid even when real reform is not forthcoming, and the
political elites in the recipient countries are incentivized to stifle change
while continuing to receive aid revenue. If aid is to provide the means
145. See generally MEREDITH, supra note 128 (providing numerous examples of misrule
in African countries).
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for true reform, the development industry must discover some way to
overcome these adverse incentives.
